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1. Introduction 
When parties write a long-term contract they have to take into account that the contract may have 
to be renegotiated in states of the world in which the initial contract gives rise to an inefficient 
allocation. An important question is how the initial contract affects behavior in the renegotiation 
game. Neoclassical contract theory argues that the only effect of the initial contract is to define 
the threat points in renegotiation. If renegotiation fails, each party can insist that the initial 
contract is carried out.1 Rational parties anticipate this and design the ex ante contract so as to 
give optimal incentives for relationship specific investments or to provide optimal insurance. 
 In recent years new approaches have been developed that point out additional effects of 
contracts on renegotiation behavior. These approaches build on behavioral regularities that are 
well documented in behavioral economics and psychology. Some papers claim that a contract 
serves as a reference point. When the contracting parties, say a buyer and a seller, renegotiate a 
contract they compare the renegotiation outcome to the outcome prescribed by the contract. Hart 
and Moore (2008) argue that these comparisons are distorted by self-serving biases that may lead 
to aggrievement and shading.2 They further hypothesize that the impact of the initial contract on 
behavior is stronger if the contract was formed under competitive conditions. Herweg and 
Schmidt (2013) point to loss aversion when the parties compare the renegotiation outcome to the 
initial contract. Loss aversion drives a wedge between the buyer’s valuation and the seller’s cost 
and makes the renegotiation outcome sticky and inefficient. Other papers argue that concerns for 
fairness affect the renegotiation outcome. For example, outcome-based models of social 
preference (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) imply that the division of the surplus depends on the 
initial price. If the initial price is high, the seller will get less of the renegotiation surplus than if 
the initial price is low. Finally, some papers point to the role of legal rules and social norms. Hart 
and Moore (2008) refer to the legal literature that says that the parties to a contract are obliged to 
renegotiate in “good faith,” which prevents the seller from raising the price ex post if this cannot 
be objectively justified. Furthermore, Hart and Moore argue that legal principles are often 
supported by social norms that shape behavior even if there are no courts in the background. This 
latter point is supported by Iyer and Schoar (2013) who argue that there is a social norm that 
constrains the renegotiation offers of the sellers. All of these theories imply that the renegotiation 
                                                            
1 See, e.g., Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1988). 
2 See also Hart (2009), Hart and Holmström (2010), and Halonen-Akatwijuka and Hart (2013) for different flavors of 
this argument.  
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outcome does not depend on outside options alone. However, they have different implications for 
the renegotiation outcome, which in turn has important implications for the design of optimal 
contracts ex ante.3  
 In this paper we report on an economic experiment that allows us to discriminate between 
the different theories and to assess the statistical (and economic) significance of the effects that 
they predict for renegotiation behavior. We consider a canonical contracting situation under 
tightly controlled conditions. Two parties can write an initial contract that fixes the specification 
and the price of a good to be traded at some future date. Then an ex ante uncertain state of the 
world materializes. With some probability the realized state requires a different specification of 
the good than the one the parties agreed upon initially. In this case the parties can renegotiate the 
initial contract. If renegotiation fails, the initial contract is carried out. This contracting and 
renegotiation game is played 24 times by the subjects, in each round against a newly matched, 
anonymous opponent. In each round the cost of the seller to adjust the specification of the good 
to the realized state of the world differs. In some rounds the cost of the seller to produce the 
efficient good is higher than the cost to produce the good specified in the contract, sometimes the 
cost is lower. Both parties perfectly observe the buyer’s value and the seller’s cost when they 
renegotiate. This provides a rich experimental set-up that allows us to test the predictions implied 
by the different theories and to discriminate between them. To do so we look at two treatment 
variations. 
First, we compare the Contract Treatment (CT) described above to a No Contract 
Treatment (NCT) that is identical to CT except for the initial contract. In NCT the buyer and the 
seller meet only after the state of the world has materialized and negotiate how to split the surplus 
from trading the efficient good. If negotiations fail each party gets an exogenously assigned 
outside option payoff. The outside options in NCT are, by design, exactly the same as the outside 
options in CT that were generated endogenously by the initial contract. Also the surplus that can 
be generated in the renegotiation game and in the bargaining game, respectively, is identical. 
Thus, from a standard game theoretic perspective the strategic situation and the material payoffs 
of the renegotiation game in CT and of the bargaining game in NCT are identical. If we observe 
that parties behave differently in CT as compared to NCT it cannot be due to the threat point 
                                                            
3 The implications for ex ante contracts are spelled out in detail in Hart and Moore (2008), Hart (2009), Hart and 
Holmström (2010), and Herweg and Schmidt (2013). 
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effect, contradicting the neoclassical view of renegotiation. In this case the initial contract must 
have additional, behavioral effects. 
Second, we study the effects of competition. In CT the seller is a monopolist who can 
make a take-it-or-leave-it offer for the initial contract to the buyer. In the Contract and 
Competition Treatment (CT&COMP) there are two sellers competing with each other. At the 
renegotiation stage the winning seller is in a bilateral relation with the buyer, exactly as in the 
renegotiation stage of CT. Hart and Moore (2008) predict that if there is ex ante competition the 
initial contract has a stronger impact on expectations and entitlements than if there is no 
competition ex ante. To test this hypothesis we conduct a simple diff-in-diff analysis: We 
compare the difference in prices between CT and NCT to the difference in prices between 
CT&COMP and a No Contract and Competition Treatment (NCT&COMP). In NCT&COMP no 
initial contract exists and the exogenously assigned outside options in the bargaining game are, 
by design, the same as the endogenously determined outside options in the renegotiation stage of 
CT&COMP (constructed in the same way as in NCT).  
We find strong and highly significant treatment effects. First, the markups4 charged by the 
sellers in the two Contract Treatments are much lower than the markups charged in the 
corresponding No Contract Treatments, even though the strategic situation and the monetary 
payoffs of the contracting parties are identical in the corresponding treatments. Likewise, buyers 
are less likely to accept any given markup in the two Contract treatments.  However, the overall 
rejection rate is not significantly different in CT than in NCT because sellers ask for lower 
markups in CT. These findings are inconsistent with neoclassical contract theory and also with a 
model of purely outcome based social preferences, but they are consistent with the idea that 
contracts serve as reference points as spelled out in Hart and Moore (2008) and Herweg and 
Schmidt (2013).  
Furthermore, Hart and Moore (2008) argue that an initial contract that was formed under 
more competitive conditions provides a more objective measure of the entitlements of the parties 
and therefore is a stronger reference point. This implies that markups should be smaller if there is 
competition for the initial contract than if it was imposed by a monopolistic seller. Thus, Hart and 
Moore (2008) predict that the difference between markups in CT&COMP and NCT&COMP 
should be larger than the difference between CT and NCT. However, we find that, if anything, 
                                                            
4 In the Contract Treatments, the markup is defined as the change in price compared to the initial price. In the No 
Contract Treatments, the markup is defined as the change in price relative to an exogenously given price that is 
identical to the price offer in the Contract Treatments. 
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the difference with competition is smaller. There is also no effect of competition on the 
acceptance rate for any given markup. Hence, competition does not strengthen the reference point 
effect. Put differently, these results show that competition is not necessary for the reference point 
effect. Even if a contract is not written under competitive conditions it has a strong effect on 
renegotiation behavior. 
However, the prices agreed upon in the initial contract are much lower with competition 
than without. We find that sellers try to compensate for the low initial prices in the Competition 
Treatments by making much more aggressive (re)negotiation offers than in the No Competition 
Treatments, even though the surplus that can be generated in the (re)negotiation games is 
identical. Buyers accept this behavior. They are willing to accept much higher markups if the 
initial price was low than if the initial price was high. Thus, despite the much more aggressive 
(re)negotiation behavior of sellers in the Competition Treatments there is no significant 
difference in the overall acceptance rates between treatments with and without competition. This 
is consistent with theories of fairness and outcome based social preferences.  
Finally we find that a significant minority of sellers is willing to deliver the efficient good 
without charging a markup in CT, but only if the cost of doing so is lower than the cost of 
sticking to the initial contract. This finding is consistent with the claim that good faith and social 
norms constrain markups in renegotiations to be objectively justifiable (e.g., by increased costs). 
However, in CT&COMP this effect largely disappears. Because the initial prices are very low 
with competition almost all sellers use the renegotiation game to increase the price. Thus, we find 
limited support for the presence of a social norm against price gauging if the initial contract was 
concluded under competitive conditions.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relation of our paper 
to the literature. Section 3 describes the experimental set-up. In Section 4 we summarize the 
theoretical predictions of the different models of renegotiation. Section 5 reports the experimental 
results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Discussion of the Literature 
Our paper is closely related to a series of papers by Fehr, Hart and Zehnder (2009, 2011, 2014) 
that experimentally test the specific predictions of the Hart and Moore (2008) model. In Hart and 
Moore (2008) the contracting parties can either write a rigid or a flexible at-will-contract. The 
flexible contract allows the parties to adjust the contract to the realization of the state of world. 
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However it may give rise to conflicting expectations. Each party expects to get the best possible 
outcome that the flexible contract allows for. If a party gets less, it feels aggrieved and shades on 
performance which is inefficient and reduces the payoff of the other party.  
Fehr, Hart and Zehnder (2011) design an experiment that closely follows the specific set-
up of the Hart and Moore (2008) model. The experimental results show that flexible contracts 
give rise to more “shading” than rigid contracts, which makes rigid contracts more profitable for 
the buyers. Fehr, Hart and Zehnder (2009) discuss the role of competition by comparing the 
original experiment to a control treatment in which the contract is not written under competitive 
conditions but rather imposed exogenously on the parties. They show that the difference in 
shading between flexible and rigid contracts disappears in the control treatment. However, the 
control treatment differs in two dimensions from the original experiment. There is no competition 
and there is no voluntary agreement to the terms of the contract. Thus, it is not clear whether it is 
competition or voluntary agreement that is driving the treatment effect.  
Fehr, Hart and Zehnder (2014) ask whether the tradeoff between flexibility and shading 
disappears if the parties can renegotiate the rigid contract. They consider a very specific form of 
renegotiation, called “repudiation,” where the buyer can change the price of the contract 
unilaterally (without asking for the seller’s agreement). They show that the basic tradeoff 
between flexibility and shading is not affected by the possibility of repudiation. In another 
treatment Fehr, Hart and Zehnder (2014) give the buyer the opportunity to announce what prices 
he wants to set in the different states of the world. This announcement is voluntary and not 
binding. They find that the announcement helps to coordinate expectations and to reduce the 
amount of shading under flexible contracts, but the basic tradeoff is still visible and significant.  
Brandts, Charness and Ellman (2013) consider a slightly different experiment in which the 
terms of the initial contract are negotiated by the two parties, while they are determined by a 
competitive mechanism in Fehr, Hart and Zehnder (2011). Brandts et al. first replicate the result 
that structured communication has a small positive effect on the performance of flexible 
contracts. Then they consider a treatment with free communication. With free communication 
flexible contracts are much more efficient than rigid contracts and they are chosen considerably 
more often.5  
                                                            
5 Erlei and Reinhold (2011) point out that if the buyer chooses a rigid contract in the FHZ (2011) experiment then the 
price is driven down by competition and the seller gets almost nothing of the surplus. If the buyer wants to give some 
of the surplus to the seller he must opt for a flexible contract and use the flexibility to increase the price. Thus, a rigid 
contract may trigger negative reciprocity while a flexible contract may be perceived as a signal of fairness. They 
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All these papers compare flexible and rigid contracts and study under what conditions 
flexible contracts give rise to shading. They consider at-will-contracts and show that there is 
indeed a tradeoff between flexibility and shading. However, none the papers considers 
renegotiation of a specific performance contract, nor do they allow discriminating between 
different theories of ex post inefficient behavior.  
Our paper is also related and complementary to a field experiment by Iyer and Schoar 
(2013). They sent trained auditors acting as customers to tailors in Chennai in Southern India. 
The customers place orders to have a garment stitched. A short while thereafter the customer 
returns to the tailor and asks for expedited stitching of the garment within one day because of an 
urgency. Iyer and Schoar find that tailors do not use this situation to renegotiate the price even if 
the customer mentions that he is out of state (and therefore no repeat customer). This contradicts 
neoclassical contract theory predicting that sellers will exploit the hold-up situation to increase 
the price. While this field experiment provides strong external validity it cannot discriminate 
between different explanations for the observed behavior.  In our lab experiments, in contrast, we 
can tightly control the conditions under which renegotiations take place and thereby discriminate 
between different theories.6 
Hoppe and Schmitz (2011) report on a laboratory experiment in which option contracts 
can be used as a remedy to solve the hold-up problem. Standard theory predicts that option 
contracts are useless if they can be renegotiated. However, Hoppe and Schmitz show that option 
contracts still have an effect even with renegotiation, which is consistent with our experimental 
findings. In Hoppe and Schmitz (2011) the terms of the option contract are exogenously given, 
while we consider standard specific performance contracts the terms of which are endogenously 
negotiated by the contracting parties. Furthermore, their experiment cannot be used to 
discriminate between different theories that are consistent with the observed behavior, while our 
experimental set-up enables us to do this by varying the seller’s costs of delivery and the degree 
of competition under which the initial contract is concluded. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
offer support for this hypothesis by comparing the original FHZ (2011) experiment to a control experiment in which 
contracts are assigned exogenously. 
6 In another field experiment, Iyer and Schoar (2010) study the reaction of wholesalers of custom-made pens in India 
when they are faced with a hold-up situation. They find that these wholesalers often refuse to renegotiate the price 
even if they lose a valuable contract. This is reminiscent of the higher rejection rates for given markups in our 
Contract Treatments as compared to the No Contract Treatments.   
7 
 
3. Experimental Design and Procedures 
The experiment considers a trading relationship between a buyer and a seller with the following 
framing. The parties want to trade a good next week, but they do not know yet what the optimal 
day for delivery is. If the good is delivered on the “right day,” the buyer’s valuation of the good is 
v=100; if it is delivered on the “wrong day” the buyer’s valuation is v=50. The parties know that 
Wednesday is the right day with 40% probability. The right day may, however, also be any of the 
other four workdays, each with probability 15%. The parties must write a contract that specifies 
the day of delivery before the right day is known, but they are aware that the contract can be 
renegotiated. 
 If the good is delivered on Wednesday, the seller’s cost is c=20. If the good is delivered 
on some other workday the seller’s cost is a random variable drawn from [0,40] with E(c)=20, 
i.e. the cost may be higher or lower than 20.7   
  
The time structure of the Contract Treatment (CT) is as follows: 
Stage 0: A buyer and a seller are randomly matched. The seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it price 
offer p for delivery on Wednesday. The buyer may accept or reject this contract. In case 
of rejection both parties get a payoff of 0 and the game ends. If the buyer accepts the 
game moves on. 
Stage 1: Both parties learn the right day and the seller’s cost of delivery on that day. If the right 
day is Wednesday, the contract is executed and the game ends. In this case monetary 
payoffs are 20SM p   for the seller and 100BM p   for the buyer. If Wednesday is 
not the right day, the buyer can ask the seller to change the day of delivery to the right 
day. If the buyer does not ask for a change of the day of delivery or if the seller insists to 
deliver on Wednesday, the contract is executed and the game ends. The resulting payoffs 
are 20SM p   for the seller and 50BM p   for the buyer.  
Stage 2: If the buyer asks for a change of the day of delivery and if seller is in principle willing to 
comply with the request, the parties enter the renegotiation game in which the seller has 
two options: 
                                                            
7 We predetermined the sequence of “right days” and the cost realizations on the “wrong days.” Wednesday was not 
the right day in 15 out of 24 periods and the realized costs took the following values: 0 (2x), 10 (2x), 18 (2x), 20 
(3x), 22 (2x), 30 (2x), 40 (2x).   
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1. He can deliver the good on the right day at the price specified in the initial contract, 
i.e. without asking for a markup. In this case the buyer does not have to make an 
acceptance decision as the markup is zero, and the seller’s payoff is SM p c  , 
while the buyer gets 100BM p  . 
2. He can make a take-it-or-leave-it renegotiation offer to the buyer, proposing to deliver 
the good on the right day if the price is changed to p+m, where m is a markup that 
may be positive or negative. If the buyer accepts the offer, payoffs are SM p m c    
and 100BM p m   . If the buyer rejects, the initial contract is executed: the good is 
delivered on Wednesday and payoffs are 20SM p   and 50BM p  . 
Subjects play this game repeatedly for 24 rounds under a stranger matching protocol.  
 
We compare the Contract Treatment to a No Contract Treatment (NCT) in which the 
parties do not write an initial contract. Parties meet only after the state of the world has 
materialized. We designed this treatment such that the renegotiation game in CT at Stage 2 and 
the bargaining game in NCT have exactly the same structure. Thus, we assign the outside options 
of the buyer and the seller in NCT as follows: For each buyer-seller pair in CT the price ݌ in the 
initial contract gives rise to a threat point  50 , 20B SM p M p     in the renegotiation game. 
We assign this threat point exogenously to the corresponding buyer-seller pair in NCT. Also, the 
surplus that can be generated is identical in the renegotiation game in NCT and the bargaining 
game in CT.8 As at Stage 2 in CT, the seller has two options if he wants to trade in NCT: 
1. In each round, there is an exogenously given price that is identical to the initial offer 
price ݌ of the corresponding buyer-seller pair in CT. The seller can deliver the good 
without changing the exogenously given price p. In this case – as in the equivalent 
case in CT – the buyer does not have to make an acceptance decision because his 
payoff is simply 50 points higher than his outside option. The seller’s monetary payoff 
then is SM p c  , while the buyer gets 100BM p  .  
                                                            
8 We used the same matching protocol in CT and in NCT. Furthermore, the sequence of the right day and the cost 
realization on the right day was the same in all sessions. Thus, if seller s is matched to buyer b in round t of session j 
in CT and his offer ݌෤ is accepted, then there exists a pair of seller s’ and buyer b’ in session j of NCT that has (i) the 
exogenously assigned outside options ܯ௧ௌ ൌ ݌෤ െ 20 and ܯ௧஻ ൌ 50 െ ݌෤ and (ii) the same opportunity for increasing 
the joint surplus in round t. 
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2. He can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the buyer, proposing to deliver the good at 
price ݌̂. If the buyer accepts the offer, the monetary payoffs are ܯௌ ൌ ݌̂ െ ܿ and 
ܯ஻ ൌ 100 െ ݌̂. If the buyer rejects, the exogenously given threat point is realized and 
payoffs are 20SM p   and 50BM p  . 
Note that the bargaining game in NCT and the renegotiation game in CT have the same strategic 
structure and exactly the same monetary payoffs. The “markup” in NCT is just the difference 
between ݌̂ and p, i.e. ݉ ൌ ݌̂ െ ݌. If the seller does not change the exogenously given price p, the 
“markup” is zero.9 
Furthermore, if the buyer rejected the seller’s initial price offer at Stage 0 in CT or if 
Wednesday was the right day in a given round in CT, then the corresponding buyer and seller in 
NCT are assigned the respective payoffs of CT exogenously. They are informed that there is no 
trading opportunity in this round but that they get some exogenously given payoffs.  
We conducted two sessions each of CT and NCT with 24 participants in the first session 
and 22 in the respective second session. We implemented three matching groups in each 
treatment.10 Upon arrival in the lab, half of the subjects were randomly and anonymously 
assigned the role of a buyer, the other half the role of a seller. We thus have 23 buyers and 23 
sellers in each treatment. 
We also conducted two sessions of the Contract&Competition Treatment (CT&COMP) in 
which sellers competed at Stage 0 for making an initial offer to the seller and two corresponding 
sessions of the No Contract&Competition Treatment (NCT&COMP).11 The treatments with 
competition are identical to the treatments without competition except for the fact that at the 
initial contracting stage two sellers compete for the right to make a contract offer to the buyer. 
The price is determined by an ascending clock auction. The starting price of the auction is zero. 
The price increases by one unit every second. The first seller to stop the clock wins the auction 
and makes a trade offer at the auction price to the buyer which the buyer can either accept or 
reject. The other seller gets a payoff of 0. Recall that in CT, a monopolistic seller can choose the 
price freely and make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the buyer. In contrast, in CT&COMP, only the 
                                                            
9 No uncertainty exists in treatment NCT and we therefore do not refer to different days of the week to illustrate the 
uncertainty and identify the “right day” for trading in the experimental instructions. 
10 In the first session of each treatment we had two matching groups with 12 buyers and 12 sellers. In the second 
session we had only 22 subjects and implemented only one matching group. With 24 rounds, subjects interacted with 
the same opponent more than once. However, subjects did not know when and with whom they would interact more 
than once. Thus, repeated game effects are unlikely. 
11 In each of these sessions we had 24 subjects and implemented two matching groups. 
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seller who wins the auction makes an offer and this offer is determined by the auction. In all other 
respects, CT and CT&COMP are identical. Finally, NCT&COMP is derived from CT&COMP in 
the same way as NCT is derived from CT. That is, in CT&COMP and NCT&COMP buyers and 
sellers face the identical strategic situations with the same monetary payoffs.  
Sessions lasted between 1.5 and 2 hours and took place at the MELESSA laboratory of 
the University of Munich between June and September 2011. Each subject participated in one 
treatment only. Subjects were students of the University of Munich and the Technical University 
of Munich. The experiments were computerized with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). 
Payoffs were measured in experimental points that were exchanged into EUR at the end of the 
experiment. It is possible that subjects make losses in given rounds, e.g., when a buyer pays a 
price exceeding 50 but the good is delivered on the wrong day so that it is worth 50 only. Such 
losses were imposed and deducted from the earnings in other rounds. On average, subjects earned 
about EUR 25 (USD 32 at the time of the experiments), which includes a show-up fee of EUR 6. 
The experimental instructions for all treatments can be found in the supplementary materials, 
which can be accessed via the journals homepage. 
  
4. Hypotheses 
In this section we discuss several hypotheses that are implied by the different theories discussed 
in the introduction. The motivation of the hypotheses in the text is informal. In Appendix A we 
derive the hypotheses more rigorously.  
We designed the experiments such that the strategic situation and the material payoffs of 
all players are exactly the same in the renegotiation game that is determined by the contracts in 
CT (CT&COMP) and the bargaining game that is set up exogenously in NCT (NCT&COMP, 
respectively). Thus, the traditional model of perfectly rational and selfish behavior (self-interest 
model) predicts the same (re-)negotiation outcome in all treatments. This is an immediate 
implication of the principle of subgame perfection. 
 
Hypothesis 1 [Self-interest Model]: The renegotiation outcome in the Contract 
Treatments with and without competition is the same as the bargaining outcome in 
the two No Contract Treatments: In all treatments the seller requests a markup of 49 
or 50, claiming (almost) the entire renegotiation surplus for himself, which is 
accepted by the buyer in equilibrium.   
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The literature on social preferences argues that many people are not purely self-interested 
but also care about the welfare of other people. Models of altruism (Andreoni and Miller, 2002), 
inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), or minmax preferences (Charness and Rabin, 2002) 
maintain the assumption that players are perfectly rational but allow for more general utility 
functions. They assume that the utility function of a player depends not only on his own material 
payoff but also on the material payoffs of other players. Since the strategic situation and the 
material payoffs of all players are the same in the Contract Treatments and the corresponding No 
Contract Treatments, these models also predict that there is no difference in behavior across 
corresponding treatments. However, the predicted behavior in the Competition Treatments differs 
from the predicted behavior in the No Competition Treatments. The reason is that fairness 
preferences predict that the bilateral renegotiation game will lead to a more equal distribution of 
the surplus, i.e., the seller will ask for a higher markup if competition lead to a low initial price 
and the buyer will accept a higher markup.   
 
Hypothesis 2 [Outcome-based Social Preferences]: The renegotiation outcome in 
the Contract Treatments is the same as the bargaining outcome in the corresponding 
No Contract Treatments. If subjects have outcome-based social preferences the 
seller will leave some of the surplus to the buyer. Furthermore, if the initial price is 
lower in the treatments with competition than in the treatments without competition, 
the seller will ask for a higher share of the renegotiation surplus when the ex ante 
contract was formed under competitive conditions. The buyer is willing to accept 
higher markups if the initial price is low (competition) than if the initial price is high 
(no competition).  
 
Even though, from a standard game theoretic perspective, the renegotiation games in the 
Contract treatments are strategically identical to the negotiation games in the No Contract 
treatments, there is of course one crucial difference. In the Contract treatments the buyer and the 
seller interacted at a previous stage by agreeing to the initial contract. If the players have 
preferences that are not based on outcomes alone this difference may affect their renegotiation 
behavior. Some possible effects have been explored in the literature.12 
                                                            
12 In addition to the effects of self-serving biases, loss aversion and social norms that we discuss below there are 
other possible effects that have not been explored in the literature so far. For example, the actions taken by the 
12 
 
 Hart and Moore (2008) argue that contracts serve as reference points that may affect ex 
post behavior. Their paper focuses on the trade-off between flexibility and shading in at-will-
contracts, while our experiment considers renegotiation of a specific performance contract. 
However, in Section VI of their paper, Hart and Moore (2008) discuss three different views on 
how their model can be applied to renegotiation. Their preferred, “intellectually more coherent” 
view takes the position that the price of the initial contract is such a strong reference point that it 
cannot be changed without an objective justification.13 Thus, the seller will not charge a markup 
if his cost to deliver on the right day goes down or stays the same. He may charge a markup only 
if his cost increases and only if the markup is justifiable by the cost increase. As Hart and Moore 
point out, this view is consistent with legal practice and social custom. “The courts require that 
renegotiation must be in good faith, but, because this is difficult to monitor, they will often 
substitute the requirement that the renegotiation can be justified objectively; for example, the 
price increases because […] (the seller’s) costs have risen” (2008, p. 31). Hart and Moore further 
argue that social attitudes and norms often mirror the law, so people will follow this norm even if 
there are no courts to enforce it. This point is also made by Iyer and Schoar (2013) who argue 
that even in the absence of a judicial system a social norm exists that prevents the seller from 
proposing a price increase.  
 
Hypothesis 3 [Social Norms (Hart and Moore, 2008, Iyer and Schoar, 2013)]: If 
there is an initial contract (in CT and CT&COMP) the seller will deliver on the right 
day without charging a markup if his cost to do so is less than or equal to his cost 
for delivery on the day specified in the initial contract. If his cost is higher for 
delivery on the right day he charges a markup that is constrained by the cost 
increase. Without an initial contract (in NCT and NCT&COMP) there are no such 
constraints and the seller will charge significantly higher markups.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
contracting partners at the initial contracting stage could signal information about their types or intentions giving rise 
to type-based reciprocity (Levine, 1988) or intention-based reciprocity (Rabin, 1993, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 
2004) at the renegotiation stage. The effects of type-based and intention-based reciprocity could go in both 
directions. This is why we do not explore this here but leave it to future research.  
13 The two other views on renegotiation both give rise to the prediction that if renegotiation is initiated, then the 
initial contract is no longer seen as a reference point and each party feels that it is entitled to get the entire social 
surplus from renegotiation. This implies that there is no difference between the Contract Treatments and the 
corresponding No Contract Treatments. An intermediate view, which takes the position that the truth must be 
somewhere in between the two extreme predictions, would imply that the initial contract somewhat constraints the 
markups charged by the seller, more so if his costs go down. This would be a weaker version of Hypothesis 3.  
13 
 
In addition, Hart and Moore (2008) argue that the reference point effect is stronger if the initial 
contract has been agreed upon under competitive conditions. The reason is that competition 
“provides a relatively objective measure of what B and S bring to the relationship” (p. 12). Thus 
if there is ex ante competition the initial contract has a stronger impact than if there is no 
competition ex ante. The next proposition summarizes this prediction: 
 
Hypothesis 4 [Reference Points and Competition (Hart and Moore, 2008)]: The 
effect of the initial contract to constrain markups is stronger if it has been formed 
under competitive conditions. Thus, the difference in markups between CT and 
NCT is smaller than the differences in markups between CT&COMP and 
NCT&COMP. Furthermore, there is no difference in negotiation behavior between 
NCT and NCT&COMP. 
 
Herweg and Schmidt (2013) offer a different theory of contracts as reference points that is 
directly applicable to our experimental design. They consider a situation where a buyer and a 
seller write a specific performance contract that may turn out to be inefficient after the state of the 
world is realized. Parties can renegotiate the initial contract, but they suffer from loss-aversion. 
Thus, when the seller offers to deliver on the right day at a higher price, the buyer compares this 
proposal to the initial contract.14 The price increase is considered a loss, the change to the right 
day a gain. Because the buyer is loss averse, losses loom larger than equally sized gains. Hence, 
the buyer is more likely to reject high markups if there is an initial contract to which the markup 
is compared, than if there is no initial contract. Anticipating this behavior the sellers will ask for 
lower markups in the Contract Treatments than in the corresponding No Contract Treatments. 
                                                            
14 Herweg and Schmidt (2013) assume that the initial contract defines the reference point. Alternatively one could 
follow Köszegi and Rabin (2006) and assume that parties form rational expectations about what is going to happen in 
the future and compare the renegotiation outcome to the full distribution of possible outcomes. This assumption 
complicates the analysis considerably, but in our experiment it has the same effect of making prices sticky. With 
40% probability Wednesday is the right day in which case there is no renegotiation and no markup. With 60% 
probability Wednesday is not the right day and the contract will be adjusted. Thus, buyers suffer a loss when they 
compare the proposed markup to the situation in which no markup is requested. This makes them more reluctant to 
accept the markup. Anticipating this effect, sellers offer more moderate markups in CT than in NCT (where buyers 
are not aware that there was a 40% chance that they did not have to pay a markup, so they do not suffer from loss 
aversion). If there is no initial contract the parties may also have a reference point (e.g. their outside options). 
However, by discussing and agreeing to the contract, the contract looms very prominently on their minds and 
becomes a much stronger reference point than if there is no initial contract. See Herweg and Schmidt (2013, p. 19-
20) for a more detailed discussion of these points.   
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Hence, the initial contract makes prices sticky.15 This prediction is similar to the prediction of 
Hart and Moore (2008). There are two important differences however. First, in Herweg and 
Schmidt the seller will always request a strictly positive markup. In contrast, Hart and Moore 
predict that no markup is requested if the seller’s cost to deliver on the right day is smaller than or 
equal to his cost to deliver on Wednesday and that the markup is bounded above by the cost 
increase otherwise. Second, in Herweg and Schmidt (2013) there is no effect of competition on 
(the strength of) the reference point.   
 
Hypothesis 5 [Loss Aversion (Herweg and Schmidt, 2012)]: The seller charges a 
lower markup if there is an initial contract than if no contract is in place. The 
markup is always strictly positive. It is independent of the cost of delivery if the 
costs are less than or equal to the cost on the day specified in the initial contract, and 
weakly increasing if there is a cost increase. It does however not matter for the 
requested markup whether the initial contract was formed under competitive or 
monopolistic conditions. Thus, the difference in markups between CT and NCT and 
between CT&COMP and NCT&COMP is the same. Furthermore, there is no 
difference in (re)negotiation behavior between CT and CT&COMP, nor between 
NCT and NCT&COMP.  
 
5. Experimental Results 
In this section we compare behavior in the renegotiation game starting at Stage 2 of the Contract 
Treatments (CT and CT&COMP) to bargaining behavior in the No Contract Treatments (NCT 
and NCT&COMP, respectively). Our experimental design ensures that the strategies available to 
both players and the material payoff functions are identical in the respective treatments. Recall 
that in the Contract Treatments renegotiation takes place if and only if (i) the seller’s initial 
contract offer is accepted, (ii) the efficient day of delivery is not Wednesday, (iii) the buyer asks 
to change the day of delivery, and (iv) the seller does not insist to deliver on Wednesday. Thus, 
we first have to report the subjects’ decisions prior to entering possible renegotiations at Stage 2. 
We start out with the treatments that have no competition at the initial contracting stage. 
                                                            
15 The same effect obtains if the initial contract is seen as an “anchor” by the two parties. The difference between 
reference points and anchors is subtle (see e.g. Kahneman, 1992). A change of the reference point changes the 
preferences of a loss-averse decision maker. In contrast, an anchor is an exogenous factor that affects behavior 
without being an expression of preferences. However, in the setup of our experiment both models have the same 
implications. We are grateful to a referee for pointing this out.  
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5.1 Initial Prices, Acceptance Decisions, and Entering Renegotiations in CT  
Sellers ask for a mean price of 64.3 at the initial contracting stage in CT. Note that if Wednesday 
is the right day, a price offer of 60 shares the surplus equally between the buyer and the seller. In 
fact, as shown in Figure 1, 60 is the mode of the price distribution at Stage 0. 88% of the initial 
contract offers (484 out of 552) are accepted. While initial price offers of less than 70 are almost 
always accepted (in 365 out of 370 cases), the rejection rate rises sharply for higher prices; price 
offers above 75 are always rejected.  
In 60% of all cases Wednesday is not the right day and an efficiency gain can be realized 
by changing the day of delivery. There are very few cases in which the buyer did not ask for a 
change of the day of delivery or in which the seller insisted on trading on Wednesday. In these 
cases the initial contract was executed. Altogether we consider 276 cases in which the parties 
entered the renegotiation game. In the following, we compare these 276 observations of 
renegotiation behavior in CT to the corresponding 276 cases of bargaining behavior in NCT.16 
 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of initial price offers and acceptance decisions in CT. 
 
 
                                                            
16 Out of the 484 initial contract offers that were accepted in CT, Wednesday turned out not to be the right day in 306 
cases. In 4 of these cases, the buyer did not ask for delivery on the right day, and in 9 cases the seller simply 
delivered on Wednesday. There are also 17 cases in which the seller did not want to trade in NCT. We disregard the 
corresponding cases in CT to ensure that we consider the same number of observations with exactly the same threat 
points and trading opportunities in CT and NCT.  
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5.2 Markups with and without Ex-ante Contracts (CT vs. NCT) 
In the renegotiation game of CT and in the bargaining game of NCT the seller can either make a 
(re)negotiation offer, i.e., offer to deliver the good if the buyer agrees to a markup, or he can 
deliver the good without asking for a price change, in which case the markup is zero. In the latter 
case no acceptance decision is required. Our main interest is whether sellers request different 
markups in CT than in NCT even though the strategies available to the players, the payoffs, and 
the threat points are exactly the same in both situations.  
 
Result 1 (The Effect of Contracts on Markups): Markups in CT are significantly 
lower and less frequent than in NCT, in particular if the seller’s cost for delivery 
does not increase.  
 
In the renegotiation game of CT sellers ask on average for a markup of 14.9, while the 
average markup in the negotiation game of NCT is 27.0. Thus, the ex ante contract causes sellers 
to reduce their markups by 44.8%. Since observations might not be independent within matching 
groups, we treat matching group averages as the unit of observation in the non-parametric tests 
throughout the paper. We find that all three matching group averages are lower in CT than in 
NCT. The difference in the means of the markup is significant at the 5% level (one-sided rank 
sum test, p=0.050).17 Figure 2 plots the average markup in the matching groups, using the fact 
that we have paired matching groups (with identical treat points). The location of the data points 
above the 45-degree line shows that the average markup is higher in NCT than in CT in each pair. 
Figure 2 also shows the respective data for our Competition Treatments, which will be discussed 
in Section 5.3 below. The regression analysis reported in Table 1, which is explained in detail in 
Section 5.4, also confirms the significance of these differences.  
Result 1 is further illustrated by Figure 3 showing the full distribution of markups in both 
treatments. For non-negative markups, the distribution of markups in NCT first-order 
stochastically dominates the distribution in CT.18 Figure 3 also shows that the seller chooses to 
deliver the good on the right day without requesting any markup in 20.7% of all cases (57 out of 
276) in CT. This happens almost exclusively when the seller’s costs to deliver on the right day 
                                                            
17 The application of a one-sided p-value is justified because we have a directed hypothesis for the comparison 
between CT and NCT. 
18 In NCT we have four observations with a negative markup while the lowest markup is zero in CT. A negative 
markup arises in NCT if the seller asks for a price ݌̂ that is smaller than the exogenously given price p.  
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are smaller or equal to 20: The seller did not ask for a markup in 53 out of the 171 cases (31%) 
where the seller’s cost was smaller or equal to 20, but he did so only in 4 out of the 105 cases 
were the cost exceeded 20 (4%). This result suggests that a significant fraction of sellers feel 
obliged to deliver the good at the terms of the initial contract if they can do so at no additional 
cost. In contrast, the seller delivers at the exogenously given price in only 9.1% of the cases (25 
out of 276) in NCT. This difference is driven by much fewer instances of delivery without 
markup in rounds in which the seller’s cost to deliver on the right day are smaller or equal to 20 
(21 out of 171, i.e. 12% only). All three matching group averages of the fraction of zero markups 
are higher in CT than in NCT (one-sided rank sum test, p=0.050).19   
 
 
Figure 2: Mark-up averages in paired matching groups in CT and NCT 
 
 
                                                            
19 Recall that the seller’s cost realizations are by design exactly identical in CT and NCT and thus cannot drive the 
treatment difference.  
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Figure 3: Cumulative frequency of markups in CT and NCT 
 
A possible confounding factor of our experimental design is that buyers and sellers self-
select into the bargaining situation in CT because they first have to agree upon the initial contract. 
This is unavoidable because mutual agreement is an essential characteristic of any contract. If the 
parties do not agree they do not reach the renegotiation stage, which happened in 12% of all 
cases. Thus, we may have less “aggressive” sellers and more “accommodating” buyers in the 
renegotiation game of CT as compared to the negotiation game in NCT, where sellers and buyers 
are randomly allocated to the bargaining situation. This may have two effects going in opposite 
directions. On the one hand, less aggressive sellers may make lower mark-up offers. On the other 
hand, more accommodating buyers may invite higher mark-ups. However, even if we ignore the 
second effect, the less aggressive offers in CT cannot possibly explain Result 1. In CT there are 
12% rejections of initial contract offers, so that the 12% most aggressive offers (of the most 
“aggressive” sellers) might not be present in the renegotiation game. Even if we disregard the 
12% highest markups in NCT, the average markup in NCT still amounts to 24.4, so the markup 
in CT is still 38.9% lower. A one-sided rank sum test on the level of matching group averages 
remains significant at the 5% level (all three matching group averages are still lower in CT than 
in NCT). Finally, in Section 5.3 below we consider treatments with competition between sellers 
at the initial offer stage. In these treatments we observe no rejections of initial contract offers, i.e. 
no sorting, but replicate the effect of contracts on markups. 
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We now turn to the buyers’ acceptance decision of the (non-zero) markup offers. We find 
that at the (re)negotiation stage 92.2% of all offers are accepted in CT and 86.1% in NCT. A rank 
sum test on matching group averages shows that this difference is not significant (two-sided, 
p=0.200). While there is no significant difference of the overall rejection rates between the two 
treatments, there is a large and significant difference if we control for the size of the requested 
markup: 
Result 2 (The Effect of Contracts on Rejection Behavior): For given requested 
markups buyers are significantly more likely to reject the offer in CT than in NCT. 
However, because sellers ask for much lower markups in CT the overall rejection 
rate is not significantly different in CT than in NCT. 
The first part of Result 2 is illustrated by Figure 4. In NCT, there are virtually no 
rejections of markups of 25 or less (1 out of 77 observations), while the average rejection rate for 
these markups is about 6% in CT (10 out of 171 observations). Also for higher markups, in the 
markup bins shown in the figure, the rejection rate is almost twice as high in CT than in NCT, 
with the exception of markups of 26-30. There are no observations of markups larger than 40 in 
CT.  
Note that we have the same selection issue here as in Result 1. However, here selection 
should unambiguously work against our result. If the “more accommodating” buyers accepted the 
initial contract in CT, they should be more likely to accept any given markup than the randomly 
selected buyers in NCT. Result 2 shows that the opposite is the case in our experiment. Thus, if 
anything, Result 2 understates the effect of the initial contract on rejection behavior.  
The regression analysis in Table 2, reported in detail in Section 5.4 below, confirms 
Result 2. The regressions show that for given markups an initial contract has a significant 
negative effect on the probability of acceptance. The size of the markup also has a highly 
significant negative effect. However, buyers are more willing to accept a higher markup the 
lower the price in the initial contract. The analysis of the buyers’ acceptance behavior shows that 
buyers are more reluctant to accept high markups in CT than to accept the same markups in NCT, 
even though final payoffs and the threat points in case of bargaining breakdown are the same.  
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Figure 4: Rejection rates in CT and NCT for given markups. 
  
To summarize, we find large and significant treatment effects on both the sellers and the 
buyers. Since the strategies available to both players and the monetary payoffs are identical in CT 
and NCT, these treatment effects cannot be due to the impact of the initial contract on the threat 
point. Instead, Result 1 shows that the mere fact that the parties had written an initial contract is 
causal for the much smaller increase in prices in renegotiations. The initial contract makes prices 
sticky. This rejects Hypotheses 1 (pure self-interest) and 2 (social preferences) but is consistent 
with Hypotheses 3 (social norms) and 5 (loss aversion). Moreover, we find that the presence of 
initial contracts causally affects the buyers’ acceptance behavior. Result 2 shows that buyers are 
less willing to accept price increases on top of an initial contract than equally sized prices in the 
treatment without an initial contract, which is again consistent with Hypotheses 3 and 5, but not 
with Hypotheses 1 and 2. The finding that about 30% of the sellers are willing to deliver on the 
right day if this does not lead to higher costs, while only 4% do so if there is a cost increase, lends 
support to Hypothesis 3. However, it also shows that about 70% of sellers ask for positive 
markups even if their cost of delivery is not higher on the right day, which is rather in line with 
Hypothesis 5 predicting that sellers will always ask for a positive markup. 
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5.3 The Effects of Competition  
In this section we address the claim of Hart and Moore (2008) that a contract that was written 
under competitive conditions provides a stronger reference point because it is a more objective 
measure of what a buyer and a seller brings to a trading relationship. If there is competition at the 
initial contracting stage, the initial contract therefore has a stronger impact on expectations and 
entitlements than if there is no competition. We test this hypothesis in the Contract and 
Competition Treatment (CT&COMP) and the No Contract and Competition Treatment 
(NCT&COMP). 
We find that the mean initial price is 24.8 in CT&COMP, compared to 64.3 in CT. The 
much lower initial price reflects the strong competition between sellers at the initial stage. In 
CT&COMP all initial contract offers are accepted. Altogether we consider 222 cases in which the 
parties entered the renegotiation game.20 
CT&COMP differs from CT in two respects: First, the initial price is determined by 
competition and not by a monopolistic seller. Second, initial prices are much lower with 
competition than without competition. NCT&COMP allows us to separate these two effects. 
NCT&COMP is derived from CT&COMP in the same way as NCT is derived from CT: There is 
no initial contract in NCT&COMP, but the buyer and the seller are exogenously assigned the 
same outside options as in CT&COMP.21 Thus, when we compare behavior in these two 
treatments there is only the effect of the contract, but no effect of lower initial prices. 
 
Result 3 (The Effect of Contracts under Competition): The average markup is 
significantly higher in NCT&COMP than in CT&COMP. However, the difference 
in markups between NCT&COMP and CT&COMP is smaller than the difference 
in markups between NCT and CT.  
 
                                                            
20 Even though we have the same number of sessions for the treatments with competition than without competition, 
we have fewer observations with competition because always two sellers are paired with one buyer. Moreover, if 
Wednesday is not the right day (240 out of 384 cases) there are 3 cases in which the buyer did not ask for a change of 
the day of delivery and 9 cases in which the seller insisted on trading on Wednesday so that the initial contract was 
executed. Also, 6 sellers decided not to trade in NCT&COMP. We again disregard the corresponding cases in 
CT&COMP to ensure the same number of observations with exactly the same threat points and the same cost 
realizations in our comparisons between CT&COMP and NCT&COMP.  
21 For each group of two sellers and one buyer in CT&COMP, the outcome of the auction and the price ݌෤ signed in 
the contract gives rise to a vector of outside options (ܯଵௌ ൌ ݌෤ െ 20, ܯଶௌ ൌ 0, ܯ஻ ൌ 50 െ ݌෤), where seller 1 denotes 
the seller who was successful in the auction. In the corresponding group of two sellers and one buyer in 
NCT&COMP these outside options and the corresponding cost realization are assigned exogenously to the buyer and 
to seller 1, while seller 2 is informed that he cannot trade in this period and gets a payoff of zero. 
22 
 
The average markup is 40.0 in NCT&COMP, while it is only 35.6 in CT&COMP. Thus, 
the initial contract that was formed under competitive conditions causes sellers to offer markups 
that are 10.8% lower than the markups offered if there is no initial contract. A one-sided rank 
sum test on markup averages in matching groups yields p=0.057. Figure 2 in Section 5.2, using 
the fact that we have paired matching groups (with identical treat points), illustrates that the 
average markup is higher in each matching group in the No Contract Treatment than in the 
corresponding matching group in the Contract treatment. Figure 5, the equivalent to Figure 3 in 
Section 5.2, shows the cumulative distribution of all markups in CT&COMP and NCT&COMP. 
It is evident that there is again a clear shift in the distribution and that the non-negative markups 
in NCT&COMP (almost) first order stochastically dominate markups in CT&COMP.22  
 
 
Figure 5: Cumulative frequency of markups in treatments CT&COMP and NCT&COMP. 
 
Note, however, that the difference in prices between NCT&COMP and CT&COMP is 
smaller than the difference in price between NCT and CT. Thus, it seems that competition does 
not constrain the seller’s markup more strongly with competition than without, which would not 
be in line with Hypothesis 4. We will get back to this point when we discuss the regression 
analysis in Table 1 below. Note that markups in CT&COMP are relatively high already such that 
                                                            
22 We have a single observation of a negative markup in NCT&COMP while all markups in CT&COMP are weakly 
positive. The cumulative frequency of the non-negative markups in NCT&COMP lies below the one in CT&COMP 
except for the frequency at a markup of 49. 
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there is less “room” for markups in NCT&COMP to exceed markups in CT&COMP compared to 
the No Competition Treatments. Figure 5 however shows that even in NCT&COMP almost all 
markup offers are strictly below 50 and almost 40% of the offers do not exceed a markup of 40. 
Hence, higher markups would have been feasible in NCT&COMP. It is thus unlikely that 
“ceiling effects” are fully driving our result that the reference point effect of contract is not 
stronger under competition.  
Let us now compare the markups charged in CT to the markups charged in CT&COMP. 
In both treatments there is an initial contract, but the initial prices are much higher in CT than in 
CT&COMP.  
 
Result 4 (The Effect of Initial Prices on Markups): Initial prices are much lower 
in CT&COMP than in CT. Sellers try to compensate for the lower initial prices by 
charging higher markups. Furthermore, sellers almost never deliver on the right 
day without charging a markup in CT&COMP.  
 
Initial prices are on average 24.8 in CT&COMP compared to 64.3 in CT. The average 
markup in CT&COMP is 35.6, more than twice as high as the average markup of 14.9 in CT. 
This difference in markups is significant and economically important. The matching group 
averages in all four matching group averages in CT&COMP are higher than the three matching 
group averages in CT (one-sided rank sum test, p=0.029). The result shows that there is a cost to 
the buyer to having strong competition at the contracting stage and to leaving little of the surplus 
to the seller in the initial contract. The cost is that after the buyer is locked in with the seller (i.e., 
after Williamson’s “fundamental transformation”), the seller will behave much more aggressively 
at the renegotiation stage if he was squeezed at the initial stage. Furthermore, in CT&COMP 
sellers deliver on the right day without charging a markup in only 4.1% of all cases (9 out of 
222), compared to 20.7% of all cases in CT (57 out of 276). A rank-sum test on matching group 
averages shows that the difference in the fraction of zero markups between CT and CT&COMP 
is significant (one-sided, p=0.029).  
To be sure, a monopolistic seller who got a large share of the surplus at the initial stage 
can also request a high markup in the renegotiation game. However, in our experiment sellers do 
not do this. If they got a good deal initially they charge modest mark-ups. They go for very high 
markups only if they got an unfavorable deal in the initial contract. These results suggest that 
competition per se does not strengthen the reference point. Rather, the specific form of 
24 
 
competition appears to matter. If, for example, the competitive outcome is considered unfair, the 
power of a contract to serve as a reference point will be weakened. This has important 
implications for contracting ex ante. If the buyer uses an auction or some other competitive 
mechanism in order to squeeze the seller’s profit, then the seller will claim a larger share of the 
surplus in the subsequent renegotiation game. Thus, a significant fraction of the financial gain 
that buyers achieve through ex ante competition can be lost again in renegotiation.23  
Let us finally turn to the buyers’ acceptance decisions of the (non-zero) markup offers 
under competition. We find that at the (re)negotiation stage 85.4% of the offers are accepted in 
CT&COMP and 86.5% in NCT&COMP. A two-sided rank sum test on matching group averages 
shows that this difference is not significant (p=0.886). However, Figure 6 illustrates that for 
given markups the rejection rates are higher in CT&COMP than in NCT&COMP. Note that there 
is no observation for a markup >50 in CT&COMP. Thus, as in the No Competition Treatments, 
buyers are more reluctant to accept a given markup if there was an ex ante contract. This is also 
supported by the marginal effects logit regressions on the buyers’ acceptance decisions reported 
in Table 2 in the next section. 
 
 
Figure 6: Rejection rates in CT&COMP and NCT&COMP for given markups. 
 
                                                            
23 The average initial price of initially accepted contract offers is 63.2 in CT and 24.8 in CT&COMP. The average 
final price is 71.4 in CT (averaging over the cases where sellers could renegotiate and those where they could not), 
an increase of 13%. The average final price in CT&COMP is 42.2, an increase of 69.7%.  
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5.4 Regression Analyses 
Table 1 reports regression analyses that support our results on what is driving the markups 
charged by the sellers. The dependent variable in all regressions is the absolute size of the 
markup in the four treatments. The No Contract Treatment serves as the baseline condition. 
“Contract” is a dummy variable taking on value 1 if an observation comes from one of the two 
treatments with an ex-ante contract (CT and CT&COMP). “Competition” is a dummy variable 
taking on value 1 if the observation comes from one of the two treatments with competition 
(CT&COMP and NCT&COMP). The variable “Price” denotes the initial price agreed upon in the 
ex ante contract. The variable “Cost” is the cost of the seller to deliver the good on the right day. 
“High-Cost” is the interaction of a dummy variable taking on value 1 if the cost on the right day 
is strictly greater than 20 with the variable “Cost.” Since observations might not be independent 
within matching groups, we cluster on the level of matching groups in all regressions reported in 
this section. 
Regression (1) is a random effects model with individual seller specific error terms. 
Regression (2) is the corresponding OLS model. Both models show that there is a large and 
highly significant difference in markups between the Contract Treatments and the No Contract 
Treatments. The coefficient on “Contract” shows that the markup is on average about 12 points 
lower in CT than in NCT. The difference is smaller in the Competition Treatments, which can be 
seen by the positive coefficient of the interaction dummy “Contract × Competition,” but 
significant (an F-test on the sum of the coefficients of “Contract” and “Contract × Competition” 
yields p=0.001 and  p=0.010 in regressions (1) and (2), respectively). The finding that markups 
are lower in the Contract Treatments than in the No Contract Treatments is consistent with the 
idea that contracts serve as reference points, i.e., with Hypotheses 3 and 5, but not with 
Hypothesis 1 of pure self-interest or Hypothesis 2 of outcome-based social preferences.  
Both regressions further show that competition as such does not affect the size of the 
markups in our experiment. The coefficient on “Competition” is insignificant, showing that 
competition does not have an effect in the No Contract Treatments. An F-test on the sum of 
“Competition” and “Contract × Competition” further shows that is also true in the Contract 
Treatments (p=0.831 and p=0.767 in regressions (1) and (2), respectively). We saw that markups 
are on average higher in the Contract treatments, but this is explained by the lower initial prices: 
Regressions (1) and (2) both show that the initial price has a strong and highly significant effect. 
An increase of the initial price by one unit reduces the markup by about 0.45 units, a strong 
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indication for social preferences (Hypothesis 2). The regressions further show that the interaction 
of Contract and Competition has a (marginally) significant influence on markups. It goes, 
however, in the opposite direction as predicted by Hypothesis 4. This shows that competition is 
not a prerequisite for contractual reference points. Contracts that have been negotiated under non-
competitive conditions may be equally strong in constraining behavior than contracts that have 
been formed under competition. The idea of “contracts as reference points” thus applies more 
generally than envisaged by Hart and Moore (2008).  
Regressions (3) and (4) consider, in addition, the cost of delivery on the right day.24 Both 
regressions show that the cost of delivery has a (marginally) significantly larger and positive 
effect on markups in the Contract Treatments than in the No Contract Treatments, where the cost 
has no significant effect. This is consistent with Hypotheses 3 and 5. Moreover, the random 
effects regression (3) suggests that markups are generally higher if there is a cost increase, which 
is indicated by the fact the variable “High-Cost” is significant. This effect is however not 
significant in the OLS regression (4). Finally, regressions (3) and (4) both show that “Cost” or 
“High-Cost” do not have a significantly different effect if initial contracts were concluded under 
competitive conditions. Table 2 reports marginal effects logit regressions on the buyers’ 
acceptance decisions that support our observation that for given markups rejection rates are 
higher in the contract treatments. Regression (1) shows that the coefficient of “Contract” is 
negative and (marginally) significant with a marginal effect of about 8 percentage points. Not 
surprisingly the effect of “Markup” is negative and highly significant. “Price” also has a 
significant negative effect. Thus, a higher markup reduces the probability of acceptance, but 
buyers are more likely to accept a high markup if the initial price was low, i.e. if a high markup is 
“fair” because it compensates the seller for the low price that he received initially. Most 
importantly, however, “Competition” and “Contract × Competition” are not significant. Thus, 
competition on its own or in conjunction with an initial contract does not affect the buyers’ 
acceptance decisions. Regression (2) allows for a non-linear effect of markups on acceptance 
decisions, which renders the effect of “Contract” significant at the 5% level. Regressions (3) and 
(4) control, in addition, for the effect of the cost of delivery on the right day, but none of these 
                                                            
24 It can be seen that the sign, magnitude and significance of the explanatory variables that we considered in 
regressions (1) and (2) remain roughly the same. Only the F-test on the sum of the coefficients of “Contract” and 
“Contract × Competition” fails to reach a conventional level of significance in the OLS model, but it remains highly 
significant in the random effects model (p=0.011 and p= 0.112 in regressions (3) and (4), respectively). The F-tests 
on the sum of “Competition” and “Contract × Competition” remain insignificant in both regressions (p=0.409 and 
p=0.465 in regressions (3) and (4), respectively). 
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variables turns out to be significant. Moreover, all other coefficients remain largely unchanged. 
Only the size of the negative effect of “Contract” on the buyers’ acceptance decisions increases to 
about 12 percentage points; the significance level remains constant. Again, our findings regarding 
the buyer’s acceptance decisions are consistent with Hypotheses 3 and 5, but they do not confirm 
Hypothesis 4. 
 
Table 1: Regression Analysis of Markups 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Random 
effects 
OLS Random 
effects 
OLS 
 markup markup markup markup 
Contract -11.70*** 
(0.000) 
-12.11** 
(0.012) 
-16.53*** 
(0.000) 
-16.85*** 
 (0.002) 
Competition -4.35 
(0.268) 
-6.24 
(0.242) 
-3.47 
(0.351) 
-5.96 
(0.238) 
Contract × Competition 5.47* 
(0.066) 
7.79** 
(0.022) 
8.12** 
(0.042) 
10.46* 
 (0.078) 
Price -0.436*** 
(0.000) 
-0.483** 
(0.012) 
-0.414*** 
(0.000) 
-0.474*** 
 (0.004) 
Cost - - -0.054 
 (0.571) 
-0.023 
(0.864) 
Cost × Contract - - 0.243** 
(0.015) 
0.222* 
 (0.090) 
Cost × Contract × 
Competition 
- - -0.140 
(0.240) 
-0.172 
 (0.506) 
High-Cost - - 0.134** 
(0.027) 
0.109 
(0.152) 
High-Cost × Contract - - 0.017 
(0.784) 
0.044 
(0.494) 
High-Cost × Contract × 
Competition 
- - -0.000 
(0.995) 
0.046 
(0.626) 
Constant 54.27*** 
(0.000) 
57.78*** 
(0.000) 
52.39*** 
(0.000) 
56.42*** 
(0.000) 
Number of clusters 14 14 14 14 
R-squared 0.404 0.407 0.441 0.443 
Observations 996 996 996 996 
Notes: Random effects and OLS regressions with markup as dependent variable. “Contract” is a dummy 
variable taking on value 1 if an observation comes from CT or CT&COMP. “Competition” is a dummy 
variable taking on value 1 if an observation comes from CT&COMP or NCT&COMP. NCT serves as 
omitted category. “Price” denotes the price in the initial contract. “Cost” denotes the seller’s cost of 
delivery on the right day. “High-Cost” is the interaction of a dummy variable taking on value 1 if the cost 
on the right day is strictly greater than 20 with “Cost.” P-values clustering on 14 matching groups are 
shown in parentheses. To account for the low number of clusters we apply a wild cluster bootstrap-t 
procedure (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2008) to determine the p-values in the OLS regressions. ***, 
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 2: Regression Analysis of Buyers’ Acceptance Decisions 
 (1) 
logit 
marginal 
effects 
(2) 
logit 
marginal 
effects 
(3) 
logit 
marginal 
effects 
(4) 
logit 
marginal 
effects 
 accept accept accept accept 
Contract -0.076* 
(0.057) 
-0.076** 
(0.047) 
-0.128** 
(0.044) 
-0.120** 
(0.033) 
Competition -0.073 
(0.386) 
-0.073 
(0.435) 
-0.057 
(0.509) 
-0.053 
(0.577) 
Contract × Competition 0.036 
(0.349) 
0.033 
(0.434) 
0.034 
(0.445) 
0.020 
(0.719) 
Price -0.004** 
(0.017) 
-0.005** 
(0.015) 
-0.004** 
(0.044) 
-0.004** 
(0.043) 
Markup -0.010*** 
(0.000) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.010*** 
(0.000) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
Markup2 - -0.000*** 
(0.000) 
- -0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Cost - - 0.002 
 (0.269) 
0.002 
 (0.223) 
Cost × Contract - - 0.000 
(0.861) 
-0.000 
(0.953) 
Cost × Contract × 
Competition 
- - 0.002 
(0.216) 
0.003 
(0.148) 
High-Cost - - -0.001 
(0.300) 
-0.001 
(0.245) 
High-Cost × Contract - - 0.002 
(0.291) 
0.003 
(0.237) 
High-Cost × Contract × 
Competition 
- - -0.003 
(0.215) 
-0.003 
(0.186) 
Number of clusters 14 14 14 14 
Observations 898 898 898 898 
Notes: Marginal effects logit regressions with buyers’ acceptance decisions as dependent variable. 
“Contract” is a dummy variable taking on value 1 if an observation comes from CT or CT&COMP. 
“Competition” is a dummy variable taking on value 1 if an observation comes from CT&COMP or 
NCT&COMP. NCT serves as omitted category. “Markup” (“Markup2”) denotes the markup offer 
(squared). “Price” denotes the price in the initial contract. “Cost” denotes the seller’s cost of delivery 
on the right day. “High-Cost” is the interaction of a dummy variable taking on value 1 if the cost on 
the right day is strictly greater than 20 with “Cost.” P-values clustering on 14 matching groups are 
shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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6. Conclusions 
Our experimental results demonstrate that a contract does more than just define the threat point of 
the renegotiation game. It also shapes and coordinates the expectations of the contracting partners 
about what is appropriate in contract renegotiation. This has a strong effect on renegotiation 
behavior. Thus, for the understanding of contract renegotiation it is not enough to look only at the 
threat point that is defined by the contract. The contract also serves as a reference point. This 
general insight is very much in line with the complementary work by Fehr, Hart and Zehnder 
(2009, 2011, 2014).  
The purpose of our paper is to disentangle the different behavioral mechanisms that could 
be at work here. We find that sellers charge substantially lower markups in the renegotiation of 
an initial contract than in an otherwise identical bargaining situation in which no initial contract 
exists. Furthermore, buyers are more likely to reject high markups if there is an initial contract. 
This is consistent with the hypotheses by Hart and Moore (2008) and Herweg and Schmidt 
(2013) that a contract provides a reference point that shapes expectations and/or entitlements. As 
predicted by Hart and Moore (2008) and by a theory of internalized social norms (Iyer and 
Schoar, 2013) we find that there is a significant minority of sellers who are willing to adjust the 
good to the needs of the buyer without charging a markup, but only if the cost of doing so is less 
than or equal than the cost of delivering the specification that was agreed upon in the contract. On 
the other hand, this also shows that the majority of sellers ask for a positive markup even if the 
cost of delivery does not increase. Moreover, if there is competition (and the initial price is low), 
the markup is almost always strictly positive. These latter observations are more in line with 
Herweg and Schmidt (2013). Finally, our experimental results do not confirm the hypothesis of 
Hart and Moore (2008) that contracts that are written under competitive conditions are more 
powerful reference points in general. Even contracts that are written under monopolistic 
conditions have a strong reference point effect. 
Furthermore, our results show that if the seller gets a low price in the initial contract (e.g. 
because of intense competition for the contract) the buyer benefits much less from this low price 
than the self-interest model predicts. The reason is that the seller will try to make up for the low 
initial price by charging a much higher markup in the renegotiation stage. The self-interest model 
always predicts a markup (almost) equal to the buyer’s renegotiation surplus, but our data show 
that markups are lower when initial prices are higher. Buyers seem to accept this behavior 
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because overall rejection rates of markup offers are not higher under competition. These findings 
are consistent with the predictions of models of fairness and social preferences.    
However, none of the theories alone is able to explain the observed behavior. Theories of 
contracts as reference points are required to explain the difference between the Contract and the 
No Contract Treatments. Models of social preferences are needed to account for the effect of 
initial prices on markups. Internalized social norms offer a good explanation for why some sellers 
do not charge a markup at all, but they cannot explain why we observe this behavior only if initial 
prices are high (in CT) and not when they are low (in CT&COMP). Thus, we need a combination 
of these different behavioral effects to fully understand the effect of contracts on renegotiation.  
These results can be informative for the optimal design of contracts, organizations, and 
other governance structures. For example, if ex ante competition does not strengthen the power of 
the contract but rather induces sellers to behave more aggressively in the renegotiation game, 
then it is less valuable for buyers to induce ex ante competition. The question arises which forms 
of competition provide a generally accepted, objective measure of who brought what to the 
relationship? And which forms of competition are considered as being unfair, such that contracts 
give rise to less powerful reference points? Our results open up the door for many other 
intriguing questions. Are formal contracts more powerful than informal agreements? Do contracts 
on trade have a different effect than contracts on the allocation of ownership rights or the 
assignment of decision rights? Under what circumstances do initial contracts cause renegotiation 
to be more or less efficient? Answering these exciting questions is left to future research. 
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Appendix 
In this appendix we formally derive the theoretical predictions summarized in Hypotheses 1-5. 
 
Hypothesis 1 is straightforward and follows directly from the assumption that all parties 
are interested only in maximizing their own material payoff and from the principle of backward 
induction.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Suppose that players are concerned about fairness and have outcome-based 
social preferences as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) 
   ( , ) max ,0 max ,0i i j i j i i jU x x x x x x x         
where ix  and jx ,  , , , ,i j B S i j   are the monetary payoffs of the buyer (B) and the seller (S) 
and ( )  reflects how much the players suffer from inequality that is to their disadvantage (to 
their advantage, respectively) with 0    . Note first that there cannot be any difference 
between the Contract Treatments and the respective No Contract Treatments because the strategic 
structure and the monetary payoffs are identical. However, the (re-)negotiation outcomes between 
the treatments with and without competition can differ, because they give rise to different initial 
prices and thereby different income distributions.  
We start at the last stage of the game where the buyer has to accept or reject the seller’s 
markup offer. If the buyer rejects the offer, monetary payoffs are 50Bx p   and 20Sx p  , 
respectively. Note that in this case the seller has a higher monetary payoff than the buyer if and 
only if 20 50p p   , which is equivalent to ݌ ൒ 35. If the buyer accepts, monetary payoffs are 
100Bx p m    and Sx p m c   , so the seller has a higher payoff then the buyer if and only if 
100p m c p m     , which is equivalent to 50 0.5m p c   . 
Consider the treatments without competition first. In these treatments the average initial 
price p was 64.3. In fact there was only one case (out of 552) in which a seller offered 35p   
and no case in which ݌ ൑ 35 and the parties entered renegotiations. Thus, if the buyer rejected 
the seller’s markup offer, he would have always gotten a lower monetary payoff than the seller. It 
follows that if the seller offers the payoff equalizing markup 50 0.5m p c   , then this 
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renegotiation offer would always be accepted by the buyer. If the seller charges a higher markup, 
the buyer would accept this markup iff 
    100 2 2 100 50 2 70p m p m c p p             
which is equivalent to  
 
 50 30
1 2
NoCOMPc
m m


    
Consider now the treatments with competition. Here the average initial price p was only 
24.8. In fact there were only 23 cases (out of 384) in which a seller offered a price 35p   and 
only 10 cases in which ݌ ൐ 35 and the parties entered renegotiations. Thus, if the buyer rejected 
the seller’s markup offer, he would have (almost) always gotten a higher monetary payoff than 
the seller. It follows that if the seller offers the payoff equalizing markup 50 0.5m p c    and if 
݉ ൑ 50, then this renegotiation offer would always be accepted by the buyer. (It happened only 
in 8 cases that the combination of the initial price and the cost on the right was such that the 
payoff equalizing markup would have been higher than 50. In these cases, the buyer trades off his 
lower monetary payoff and the reduced inequality, and would accept the offer iff ݉ ൑ 50 ൅
ߚሾ70 െ 2݌ሿ ൌ ෥݉ .) If the seller charges a markup higher than the payoff equalizing markup, the 
buyer would accept iff 
    100 2 2 100 50 70 2p m p m c p p             
which is equivalent to  
 
 50 30 (70 2 )( )
1 2
COMPc p
m m
  

       
A fair-minded seller with 0.5  will choose a markup that equalizes payoffs (or ෥݉ ). 
Recall that this will always be accepted by the buyer. Note that because the initial price is much 
lower with competition than without, such a seller would request a higher markup if there is 
competition than if there was no competition ex ante. (Note that also ෥݉  is always higher than the 
payoff equalizing markup without competition.) A mainly self-interested seller with 0.5  will 
choose the highest markup that he believes to be still be accepted by the buyer. Note that as long 
as 35p  (which happened in more than 95% of all cases) the highest acceptable markup in the 
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Competition Treatments  COMPm is again higher than the highest acceptable markup in the No 
Competition Treatments  NoCOMPm .  
In the experiment sellers do not know the  and   parameters of their opponents. They 
may have had different beliefs about the distribution of these parameters and they may have 
differed in their degree of risk aversion. Both effects can give rise to a distribution of markup 
offers and some rejections of markup offers in equilibrium. However, since subjects are 
randomized to treatments, there should be no systematic difference in beliefs and risk aversion of 
sellers across treatments and we should expect that the distribution of markup offers is shifted to 
the right in the treatments with competition. Furthermore, the buyers’ maximum acceptance 
levels should shift to the right by the same amount, so that there is no difference in actual 
rejection rates across treatments. Finally, the maximum acceptance levels of the buyers are 
increasing in the seller’s cost in all treatments. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Hart and Moore (2008) argue that the initial contract forms a reference 
point. They assume that parties have self-serving biases, i.e. each party feels entitled to get the 
maximum payoff that is feasible in a given situation. If a party gets less than what it feels entitled 
to it is aggrieved and shades in proportion to its aggrievement. There are no shading opportunities 
in our experiment, but the buyer can reject the contract. Thus, the more the buyer is aggrieved, 
the more likely it is that he will reject the contract.  
Consider first the treatment without an initial contract. In this case the seller feels entitled 
to a markup of 50m   and the buyer feels entitled to a markup of 20m c  . The seller can 
make a take-it-or-leave-it offer, so he will propose a markup that maximizes the product of the 
markup and the probability that the markup is accepted. Note that the optimal markup is 
increasing in the seller’s cost.  
Consider now the Contract Treatments. Here the contract sets a strong reference point 
because both parties agreed to the price p . How is this reference point affected by renegotiation? 
Hart and Moore (p. 31) favor the view that any flexibility must be built into the initial contract. If 
this is not the case, there is no flexibility and the parties will stick to the initial price – in 
particular if the cost of the seller to produce on the right day is reduced:  
 
36 
 
“…we believe that this position is consistent with legal practice and social custom. 
The courts regard contract renegotiations with some suspicion and may overturn them 
if they believe that opportunism or duress has played a role. (Social attitudes and 
norms often mirror the law.) To this end the courts require that renegotiation must be 
in `good faith,´ but, because this is difficult to monitor, they will often substitute the 
requirement that the renegotiation can be justified objectively; for example, the price 
increases because the seller is supplying an additional service and her costs have 
risen.” (p. 31) 
 
Thus, if the cost of the seller to produce the good on the right day is smaller or equal than 
his cost to produce on the initially specified day, the social norm will constrain the seller to 
deliver on the right day without charging a markup. If his costs are higher, he will offer to deliver 
on the right day and request a markup that can be justified by his cost increase. In the 
corresponding No Contract Treatments, no social norm ties the markup to the seller’s cost and 
markups will thus be higher on average. However, Hart and Moore (2008, p. 30) also discuss two 
other possible views that both give rise to the following prediction in our experimental setup. 
According to these alternative views the possibility of renegotiation undermines the role of the 
contract as a reference point. In the extreme, as soon as the parties realize that the contract can be 
renegotiated, each party feels entitled to get the entire surplus from renegotiation – as in the No 
Contract Treatments. In Hypothesis 3 we take an intermediate position between these different 
views. The initial contract has some power to restrict the markups charged by the seller, in 
particular if his cost to produce on the right day is smaller or equal than 20, but for some subjects 
the power of the reference point may be reduced by renegotiation, so we predict to see some 
sellers requesting markups that are higher than their cost increase.   
 
Hypothesis 4 considers the effect of competition. In CT&COMP, both parties agreed to 
the price p and - because the price is competitive - “it provides a relatively objective measure of 
what B and S bring to the relationship” (Hart and Moore, 2008, p. 12). Also in CT buyer and 
seller agree to a price ݌. The social norm to deviate from this price only when this can be justified 
by a cost increase will however be weaker because the contract is not concluded under 
competitive conditions. This implies that with competition the effect of the initial contract to 
constrain markups is stronger than without competition. Higher markups will thus be requested in 
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CT than in CT&COMP, so that the difference in markups between CT and NCT will be smaller 
than the difference between CT&COMP and NCT&COMP. 
 
Hypothesis 5 builds on Herweg and Schmidt (2013). These authors also argue that the 
initial contract serves as a reference point, but the mechanism by which it affects the 
renegotiation outcome is based on loss aversion. When two parties write a long-term contract that 
has to be renegotiated after the realization of the state of the world, they take the initial contract 
as a reference point to which they compare gains and losses of the renegotiated transaction. 
Suppose that the buyer and the seller agreed ex ante to trade some specification the good (e.g. 
delivery on Wednesday) at price p. Then, after the realization of the state of the world they want 
to adjust the specification of the good (e.g. to delivery on the right day) and the price. However, 
the buyer feels a loss if the renegotiated price p  is greater than the initially agreed payment p . 
Similarly, the seller feels a loss if his cost to produce the new specification x is larger than his 
cost to produce the initially agreed specification x . These losses loom larger than equally sized 
gains, e.g. the gain of the buyer to consume on the right day or the gain of the seller of receiving 
a larger payment. This drives a wedge between the value increase of the buyer and the cost 
increase of the seller which makes the renegotiation outcome sticky and potentially inefficient. In 
the context of our experiment the buyer will agree to the seller’s renegotiation offer if and only if
100 50Bp m m p      , where 0 reflects the degree of loss aversion. This is equivalent 
to  
50
1 B
m   . 
Thus, the larger the degree of loss aversion, the smaller is the highest acceptable markup for the 
buyer.  
The seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the buyer. He wants to choose the highest 
possible markup that is still accepted by the buyer subject to the constraint that he himself prefers 
this outcome to the outcome prescribed by the initial contract, i.e., if 
 max 20,0 20Sp m c c p      . Thus, if 20c  this constraint is always satisfied (for any 
markup 0m  ). However, if 20c  the seller is willing to agree to a renegotiation outcome only 
if   1 20Sm c   .  
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In the experiment the seller did not know the degree of loss aversion of the buyer and thus 
not the highest acceptable offer. If the seller is risk neutral he maximizes his expected payoff:  
   50 50Pr 1 1 ( 20) 1 Pr 1 20S B S BEU p m c c pm m                              
subject to    max 1 20 ,0Sm c   . Let us assume that  2 2Pr (50 / ) 1 / 0B m m      
which is a sufficient condition for the unconstrained maximization problem of the seller to have a 
unique solution *m  that is characterized by the first order condition  
 
50Pr 1
50 *Pr 1 * 2 ( 20)
*
B
B Sm m c
m m

 
                   . 
By the implicit function theorem, the optimal markup *m is an increasing function of c. Thus, 
the optimal markup of the seller is given by    ( ) max *( ),max (1 )( 20),0Sm c m c c    which 
is also weakly increasing in c. 
Different sellers may choose different markups depending on their own degree of loss 
aversion S , their degree of risk aversion, and their beliefs about the buyer’s B . These 
parameters are not observable in the experiment. However, an unambiguous prediction of the 
model is that the optimal markup is increasing in c, which is observable.  
